Nativist--Empiricist Bathwater 1 Abstract Allen and Bickhard indict cognitive theories that presume innate representational structures, and they reject most modern theories of psychology, because these posit a role for encoding in knowledge development.
The Babies, the Representations, and the Nativist--Empiricist Bathwater Various versions of the 'nativist--empiricist debate' have been with us at least since John Locke formulated some of the basic principles of empiricist philosophy in the 17 th century (Locke, 1690) . As Allen and Bickhard suggest in their target article (this issue), empiricist and nativist perspectives have dominated the scientific landscape in pendulum--like alternation across the centuries. Most recently, from the 1970s into the present, theories and data consistent with nativism have assumed positions of prominence in the Developmental Psychology literature (Baillargeon, 1987; Meltzoff & Moore, 1977; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007; Wynn, 1992) . However, for more than 50 years, several theorists have been arguing forcefully that nativism in all its variations is inherently non--developmental (Beach, 1955; Blumberg, 2005; Gottlieb, 1981; Johnston, 1987; Moore, 2001) . Although there are nativists who disagree with this assessment (Carey, 2009; Spelke & Newport, 1998) , the rise of nativism has been accompanied by a growing number of critics.
Among these critics have been those arguing that systems theories such as Dynamic Systems Theory (Thelen & Smith, 1994) , connectionism (Elman, Bates, et al., 1996) , and Developmental Systems Theory (Oyama, Griffiths, & Gray, 2001; Spencer, Blumberg, et al., 2009 ) can help us dispense with the nativist--empiricist debate, and thereby facilitate the study of development. I, too, believe transcendence of the nativist--empiricist debate is a worthy goal (Moore, 2001 (Moore, , 2009 , so Allen, Bickhard, and I agree on this point.
But even though achieving transcendence is likely to entail utilizing an approach similar in some ways to Allen and Bickhard's, certain aspects of their arguments could nonetheless hinder progress toward our goal. In their introduction, Allen and Bickhard define emergent--constructivism as "the assumption that representational knowledge can be emergent in the construction of action systems" (Allen & Bickhard, p. 97).
Emergence and construction are concepts that now seem likely to be essential elements of any comprehensive theory of psychological development; certainly it has become clear that the biological processes that underlie psychological development involve emergence and construction. In fact, functional genes-once thought to be the basic, atomistic elements responsible for biological development-are now known to be constructed in a developmental process, so genes as we conceived of them through much of the 20 th century do not actually exist (Keller, 2000; Moss, 2003; Noble, 2006) . Once constructed, genes are best thought of not as agents that cause development, but rather as resources that interact and collaborate with other, nongenetic developmental resources in ways that lead to the emergence of complex biological organs like the brain, an organ characterized by structures and functions that are never determined by genetic factors alone (Griffiths & Gray, 1994; Lickliter & Berry, 1990; Moore, 2001; Robert, 2004) . Discoveries about the roles of emergence and construction in biology have influenced thinking among infancy researchers so much that the XVII th annual presidential address to the International Society on Infant Studies was strongly critical of nativistic theories that disregard these findings (Lewkowicz, 2011) . Notwithstanding the ascendance of such ideas among infancy researchers, Allen and Bickhard remain concerned that developmental psychologists-including nativists, but also those who consider themselves to be empiricists or systems theorists-still lack the theoretical resources needed to adequately account for the emergence and construction of representational knowledge in the human mind. Because of this focus on representational knowledge, Allen and Bickhard believe transcending the nativist--empiricist debate will require more than adopting a perspective that highlights the roles of emergence and construction in development. Specifically, they argue that this transcendence will require abandoning a central idea in cognitive science, namely that "representation is fundamentally constituted as encodings" (Allen & Bickhard, manuscript p. 2). Furthermore, they argue that only an "action--based framework" will be able to explain "the nature, origins and development of human knowledge" (Allen & Bickhard, p. 96) . It is on these latter two points that our opinions diverge. Allen and Bickhard's conclusions result from their commitment to maintaining a clear distinction between "epistemic contact (detection) and epistemic content (representation)" (Allen & Bickhard, p. 114).
Epistemic contact occurs whenever an organism detects "objects and properties in the world," whereas epistemic content is generated only when epistemic contact generates "knowledge…of those objects and properties" (Allen & Bickhard, p. 127, emphasis added). So, for example, a tree detects (i.e., makes epistemic contact with) its environment inasmuch as the climatic conditions in which it is growing are reflected in the width of its growth rings; however, trees do not know anything about (i.e., have any epistemic content about) their environments. Similarly, Reznick (2000) offered the example of infants who respond with the same rash to allergens that derive from a variety of categorically related sources, thereby indicating that they have detected something similar about the allergens even if they do not actually know anything about the category.
In contrast, an adult who has allergic reactions to cherries, peaches, and plums might avoid novel fruits like nectarines because she knows she has an allergy to drupes, fruits that contain a single hard pit at their core.
like nectarines because she knows she has an allergy to drupes, fruits that contain a single hard pit at their core. So, infant researchers have used "representation" to mean several things, and by considering the implications of this practice, Allen and Bickhard have provided a valuable service, because confusion is bound to arise in the presence of this kind of polysemy (Keller, 2010 Ungerleider (1995) , who wrote "many studies have found cells whose response to the initial cue is maintained at some level through the delay period. Thus, the memory of the cue appears to endure by maintaining the activity of cells that represent the cue" (p. 174). Here, Ungerleider used the word "represent" in a standard way that Allen and Bickhard would nonetheless object to (i.e., not to refer to symbolic representation). But more important is the extent to which Ungerleider's observation undermines the idea that sensory/perceptual processes and mnemonic/cognitive processes can be clearly distinguished. If infant researchers conflate detection and representation, perhaps it is because the distinction between them cannot be as strictly maintained as Allen and Bickhard would have it.
Central to
As noted above, Allen and Bickhard's criticism of theories that use the idea of encoding is rooted in their concerns about conflation between detection and (symbolic) representation. But even though our intuitions tell us that knowledge is distinct from detection, it is not necessarily clear how to construe "knowledge" as different from "perception" given that both utilize the same kinds of neurological resources (e.g., Martin, Haxby, et al., 1995; Martin, Wiggs, et al., 1996) . In discussing the need to distinguish detection and representation, Allen and Bickhard write that "a thermostat's sensitivity to temperature constitutes an ability to detect differences…[but] the thermostat does not have representational knowledge regarding what those detections are about -temperature" (Allen & Bickhard, p. 121). This analysis seems reasonable, of course, but a human brain is quite a bit more complex than a thermostat, and although we do not yet understand how conscious, symbolic knowledge emerges in our brains, the fact remains that the structures and processes involved in detection appear to be the same kinds of structures and processes that are involved in higher--order representation; consider, for example, Penfield's classic studies (1954, 1975 ) in which neurological stimulation was able to produce the subjective experiences of hearing, remembering, dreaming, and seeing.
Although we all have the subjective impression that we "know" things about the world-that is, that a conscious, epistemic agent in our heads is able to interpret the meaning of the information that reaches itneuroscientists have overwhelmingly rejected this Cartesian perspective as untenable (see Dennett, 1991) . In fact, some of our symbolic representations might best be thought of as epiphenomena. Allen and Bickhard distinguish between a genuinely "informational" relationship "in the semantic or representational sense" (Allen & Bickhard, p. 128), and a "technical-covariational-informational relationship" (Allen & Bickhard, p. 120) in which a system's sensitivity to the environment results merely in covariation between the environment and the system. Consistent with this conceptualization, a baby's brain might, through the simultaneous firing of a specific collection of neurons, establish a "technical informational relationship" with a dog she sees, but Allen and Bickhard would not consider this to mean the baby has generated a symbolic representation of the dog. But even if this specific neural activity does not constitute a symbolic representation of the dog for the baby, the "technical" relationship provides information about the dog, in which case the symbolic representation might not be as important as Allen and Bickhard seem to think it is. If detection-along with recollection and manipulation of that which has been detected-can provide information required to survive and reproduce in this world, it is not necessarily clear what the importance of "representational knowledge" might be. One bit of evidence relevant to this suggestion is the finding that Schöner and Thelen (2006) , using a dynamic field model of habituation, were able to provide a coherent explanation of all of the extant data related to Baillargeon's (1987) occluded object paradigm, without needing to presume that infants have any representational knowledge of objects at all.
Of course, the development of imagination and some other distinctively human cognitive processes might still require additional explanation (but see Martin et al., 1996 , for neurological evidence from a task requiring "imagined" behavior). However, the preponderance of human psychological processes-for example, all of those we share with other mammals, including "error guided behavior and learning" (Allen & Bickhard, p. 126)-probably do not require the kind of "representational knowledge" Allen and Bickhard fight so hard to save. A complete understanding of human cognition requires a theory that explains how people can sometimes understand the conceptual basis of an abstract category, but a science of cognitive development can still make progress without first resolving such issues. If perception and cognition are not as distinct as Allen and Bickhard seem to believe, then the idea of encoding might be unproblematic, and theories of cognitive development can posit emergence and construction even if they are not action--based. Although there are many empirical reasons to believe action contributes to cognitive development (Campos, Anderson, et al., 2000; Sommerville, Woodward, & Needham, 2005; Soska, Adolph, & Johnson, 2010) , it seems unnecessarily restrictive to maintain that "only an action based approach" (Allen & Bickhard, p. 96, emphasis added) will provide a workable theory of cognitive development, or that "action is essential and intrinsic to the ontology of representation itself" (Allen & Bickhard, p. 124). After all, if, as Allen and Bickhard assert, "knowledge just is competent (inter)action with the environment" (MS p. 127, emphasis in original), one implication would be that damage to the human spinal cord at the second cervical vertebra-and its consequent tetraplegia-must necessarily entail an immediate loss of "knowledge," or at the very least, the loss of the ability to generate new knowledge, a proposition that seems prima facie to be false. While Allen and Bickhard are probably right that a truly passive mind cannot come to know the world, this does not necessarily require the kind of action (i.e., motor activity) they insist on. Instead, approaches like DST or connectionism seem equipped to account for the emergence and construction of representational knowledge even if some of that knowledge arises from interactions between the world and non--action--based processes like perception (as in Martin et al., 1995) .
Such approaches need not posit the existence of either conceptual or perceptual "innate representational features" (Allen & Bickhard, p. 116). For reasons detailed in Allen and Bickhard's comprehensive critique-including, importantly, the "lack of perceptual level controls" (Allen & Bickhard, p. 117) used in typical nativist infant research (see also Clearfield & Mix, 1999 , 2001 Cohen & Marks, 2002; and Moore & Cocas, 2006) -the findings and arguments of nativists like Baillargeon (1987) , Wynn (1992) , Spelke and Kinzler (2007) , and Carey (2009) cannot support claims that young infants have full--blown representational knowledge like that which cognitive scientists sometimes assume exists in adults. Allen and Bickhard's criticism is particularly appropriate given the importance of recognizing that all psychological characteristics arise in development. The primary effect of notions like "innate representational primitives" (Carey, 2009, p. 29) or "core knowledge" (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007, p. 89) is to "short--circuit … investigation of … developmental relationships" (Lehrman, 1953, p. 359) ; clearly, any approach that relies on the existence of featural or conceptual representations that are foundational-that is, present prior to development-will fail to explain how such representations develop, so such "foundationalism," as Allen and Bickhard emphasize, has no place in truly developmental theories of cognition. Nevertheless, it seems unnecessary at present to dispense with all psychological theories that posit a role for encoding processes, or to restrict ourselves in the future to using only action--based approaches in elaborating our theories. Transcending the nativist--empiricist debate is a critical step in bringing a developmental perspective to cognitive psychology, but transcendence is within reach given the tools provided by DST, connectionism, and other interactionist approaches to the emergence of knowledge.
